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Benefits of Confidence Intervals
All of the participants in the current debate seem to agree that both significance tests and CIs are subject to misinter-pretation. The issue in choosing between the two is therefore not whether one is immune from misinterpretation but rather which of the two is more useful to a thoughtful reader. Consider, for example, the point estimate of 2.3 from the study of Foxman and Frerichs,6 with its 95 per cent CI from 0.4 to 17.3. Figure I contrasts the information about the association that is imparted by the point estimate in combination with the results of a significance test for alpha=5 per cent versus the information that is imparted by the 95 per cent CI. A minus sign is used to denote a population value for the measure of effect that is unlikely, according to a specified statistical criterion, to have given rise to the observed data. On the other hand, a plus sign denotes a value with which the observed data are reasonably compatible. A question mark denotes a value for which one is unable to make a judgment as to compatibility.
If tions. As in Figure 1 , the availability of a CI greatly reduces the uncertainty.
In many if not most epidemiologic settings it is the null value for the association that is the single population value with which the researcher would most like to compare the point estimate. Nevertheless, referring again to Figure 2 , it may be useful to know that the data are in this instance imcompatible with population values greater than 1.0 but less than 1.3. If a value at least as large as 1.3 would be of substantive importance, then the CI serves to support the substantive as well as the statistical significance of the association. On the other side of the CI, it may also be useful to know that in the absence of systematic bias the population value of the odds ratio is unlikely to be larger than 4 assessment of interaction as "a measurable degree of protection against what may be artifactual," Walker stresses the resultant "inability to recognize variability that has its roots in the population." Certainly, if one's substantive conclusion is phrased in terms of effect modification, then the analysis should address that issue directly, using CIs around the interaction parameter. For example, a conclusion that a given exposure has more of an effect on disease incidence in males than in females should be drawn only if it is supported by formal assessment of the relative magnitude of effect for males versus females. The mere fact that power is often low for the detection of such interactions does not justify indiscriminant use of a 90 per cent or 80 per cent CI. The result would be large numbers of false positive findings of interaction. The proper remedy for low power is a larger study.
When the analysis of subgroups is of interest rather than interaction per se, Walker is correct in suggesting that no formal assessment of interaction need be conducted. However, when scrutinized closely, many analyses of subgroups have substantive interest only if interpreted in the context of interaction. Suppose, for example, that separate estimates of effect are calculated for males and females. If the two point estimates are of similar magnitude and both CIs exclude the null value, then from a methodologically sound study one can validly conclude that there is evidence for an association in both groups. However, if the null value is excluded for one sex only or if the point estimates differ in magnitude, then contrasting the results for the two sexes is almost inescapable in any thoughtful discussion of the results. Proper consideration of the role of chance in such comparisons necessitates formal assessment of interaction.
In the context of interaction, both tests and CIs seem especially prone to misinterpretation, even by respected investigators writing in leading journals. A highly prevalent practice is to draw substantive conclusions about differential effects across subgroups on the basis of the following criteria: 1) differences in the point estimates; or 2) exclusion of the null value in one subgroup but not in another.
Inferences based on criterion 1 may have little more validity than reliance on the toss of a coin, and they are indicative of a statistical double standard. When overall effects are at issue, most authors (although obviously not Foxman and Frerichs) tend to be appropriately unimpressed by an observed association of a given magnitude, unless the null value or some other population value of interest can be excluded by a reasonable statistical criterion. Yet, when it comes to interaction, they expound in the discussion sections of their papers on the biological basis for effect modification when all they have observed is that the numeric value of the point estimate for the measure of effect is larger in one subgroup than in another. Elaborate mechanisms are often proposed to explain differences that are almost equally likely to have been in the opposite direction. Although theorizing is certainly to be encouraged, so is the exercise ofjudgment in the selection of a starting point.
Basing inferences concerning interaction on criterion 2 is particularly disturbing, because that criterion may appear to take reasonable account of the role of chance. However, when the magnitude of effect in the population is identical within two subgroups and a 95 per cent CI is employed, the probability that the null value will be excluded in only one subgroup can greatly exceed 5 per cent. For example, if the power of a study to detect the effect is 90 per cent in one subgroup and 60 per cent in another, then the probability of erroneously concluding that interaction is present on the basis of criterion 2 is (0.90)(0.40)+(0.60)(0. 10) = 0.42. Use of this criterion opens the floodgates for interaction after interaction that will be reported, interpreted, but never replicated in more appropriately analyzed studies.
Multiple Comparisons
Fleiss2 points out correctly that multiple comparisons are just as problematic when CIs are used as when tests are used. However, it is Walker' who poses the question that goes to the heart of this often misunderstood issue. He asks: "Should I discount an interesting finding because the investigator tested some hypotheses which I consider absurd?" This question highlights a common fallacy of inference from data. Frequently it is assumed that simply because multiple associations have been examined, the credibility of a given significant result is diminished. Large numbers of comparisons do greatly increase the likelihood of inappropriately excluding the null value for at least one of the total set of associations examined, but the result for a particular association depends in no way on what else has been examined. What makes a particular positive finding suspect is its low biological plausibility and the paucity of prior data in support of it. There is no necessary correspondence between the number of associations examined and how reasonable they are on average. In a study of breast cancer, for example, one could include a fair number of risk factors for which there is already impressive empirical evidence.'0 Conversely, an investigator who examines just a single association may well have chosen to waste time on studying a highly implausible relationship.
In light of these considerations, it seems reasonable to follow Walker's recommendation to report the statistical results for multiple associations as one would if each were the only one under investigation. The number of associations examined in a study is much too poor a surrogate measure of the plausibility of an individual association to warrant procedures such as the Bonferoni adjustment.'" Use of such procedures would only serve to make it virtually impossible to detect associations that do in fact exist in the population. As 3) Do not shy away from commenting on the exclusion or nonexclusion ofthe null value-The anecdotes reported by Fleiss2 indicate that in some quarters such comments may be regarded as inappropriate. Nevertheless, exclusion versus nonexclusion is a highly relevant scientific issue. Provided that no claims are made that failure to exclude the null value proves the null hypothesis, and provided that CIs are presented, even the terms "statistically significant" and "statistically nonsignificant" would seem appropriate and are subject to no special misinterpretation. 4 ) Avoid putting forth biological plausibility as a substitute for informative data-In my view, all reports of empirical work, including those examining highly plausible relationships, should be capable of standing on their own in the sense of permitting the statistical exclusion of something of interest. This exclusion need not always be at conventional levels of significance, and it clearly must be assessed in the context of confounding and other distortions of the true biological relationship. Nevertheless, the decision whether to submit for publication a study in which the CI at issue is 0.4 to 17.3 should depend not only on issues of plausibility but also in part on whether the authors feel they can argue persuasively that the exclusion of odds ratios below 0.4 and above 17.3 is a non-trivial contribution to knowledge. 5) Exercise greater caution than seems currently to be the norm for the interpretation ofinteractions-Much looser statistical criteria are frequently employed for concluding that interaction has been demonstrated than that a main effect has been. Low power for the typical epidemiologic study to detect interactions does not justify this relaxation of statistical standards. The resulting multitude of false positive findings erodes the credibility of the discipline and diverts scarce resources to the pursuit of bad leads. Fleiss underscores an important reason for particular caution in the interpretation of interactions in that nondifferential misclassification of a variable can produce systematic but spurious heterogeneity of effect across subgroups when the true effect is in reality constant.'2 Yet another reason for caution stems from the dependence of observed patterns of interaction on the statistical model employed. Since the biologically "correct" model to use for unbiased assessment of interaction (e.g., the additive or multiplicative model) depends on generally unknown features of the underlying biologic process,'3 substantive interpretation of heterogeneity of effect according to a particular model is hazardous.
6) Avoid the use of techniques that purport to adjust for the fact that multiple associations have been examinedSuch techniques compromise power, obscure the interpretation for individual associations, and substitute an irrelevant mechanical maneuver for critical scientific judgments concerning plausibility.
